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The Tofflerian Paradox
Robert J. Bunker -t t=
The revolution in military afh.irs (RMA) debate
and what it means to the US Army’s future is widely
recognized. In April 1994, the US Army War Col-
lege Strategic Studies Institute held its annual strat-
egy conference, “The Revolution in Mili
TAffairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century.”
The conference focused on a phenomenon that
“poses as many challenges as it offers opportunities
to America’s Army and its leadership. The RMA
changes the way war will be conducted. America’s
Army must be prepared with the appropriate doc-
trine and organization, as well as with the advanced
technology that the RMA offers.”2
Alvin Toffler, a keynote conference participant,
and his wife Heidi, have significantly influenced
Army RMA theoretical thinking.3 Their best selling
books-Future Shock, The 77zirr.fWwe and Power-
sh~fi-have made them influential and widely read
20th-century futurists. Their 1993 “tour de force, ”
WarandAnti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st
Century, further establishes their dominance in this
subject area. Senior Army leaders such as Army
Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan and
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADK) Commander General Frederick M.
Franks Jr. turned to the Tofflers for insight. Such
important theoretical works as l%e U.S. Army in
Transition II and War in the Inforrnatwn Age bear
the Tofflers’ imprint.4
Because of the Tofflers’ acclaim, their theoretical
RMA insight and the position they hold as today’s
best-known and respected futurists, no real critical
variance with their ideas has developed in military
literature. At most, we have witnessed Colonel Rich-
ard M. Swain’s retieshingly candid February 1994
Militmy Review book review and Steven Metz’s cau-
tionary statement in the Winter 1994-1995 Paramet-
ers review essay —’’The popularity of the Tofflers’
book in the US military is understandable, but worri-
some.”5 Given the issue’s importance---the Army’s
future as an effective 21st-century warllghting
institution-Toflerian theQry attributes that are con-
ceptually flawed should be forcefully acknowledged.
Wkh this perspective in mind, I posit that the war
forms developed in War and Anti–War, specifically
First and Second Wave war, are overgeneralized and
distort Western warfare’s historical development.
As such, the war forms do not significantly further
RMA theory and potentially pose a great liability.
Still, these terms are becoming accepted by Army
scholars because of the Tofflers’ great theoretical
influence.
“The Waves of WarfaI#’ scheme, illustrated in
Figure 1, was included in Army Focus 1994: Fore
XX, an official September 1994 Department of the
Army publication. This unfortunate trend must be
reversed before these concepts become too fmly
ingrained in Amy RMA literature.
The Tofflers’ War and Anti-War thesis is straight-
forward: ‘The way we make war reflects the way we
make wealth-and the way we make anti-war must
reflect the way we make war,’% Based on this per-
ception, war is viewed as a reflection of wealth that
subordinates it to society’s pmniling production
mode. Similar to Marxist materialism, without the
Hegelian metaphysics, this theory of “super-
civilintions” resides in a paradigm that views human
histo~ as three fyeat eras or waves as reflected in
Figure 2. A civilization wave can exist side by side
with other civilization waves and manifest its own
unique cultural variants such as European or Japa-
nese Second Wave industrialism. It is also thought
that a clash of civilization waves may well ~present
the 21st~ntury world conflict pattem.7
Fmt Wave civilization is based on the agricultural
revolution outing 1O,(KIOyears ago that led to per-
manent settlements and the rise of organized states.
Second Wave civilization is based on the 300–year–
old industrial nwolution founded on the introduction
of the steam engine, factory organization principles,
Newtonian concepts and Descmtian philosophy.
Third Wave civilization, now emerging, is based on
the knowledge revolution introduced by computer–
related technology. Each civilization wave develops
its own unique social structunx based on distinctive
economy, media policy and family forms.g
Tofflerian War Forms
Each civilization wave also develops its own
unique war form. A war form is envisioned to rep-
resent a true military revolution as opposed to a
subrevolution based on technological change that
somehow modifies an existing war form by either
adding new elements or creating new combinations
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out of current elements. A true military revolution
“occurs only when a new civilization arises to chal-
lenge the old, when an entire society transforms
itself, forcing its armed services to change at every
level simultaneously-from technology and culture
to organization, tactics, training, doctrine and logis-
tics. When this happens, the relationship of the mili-
tary to the economy and society is transformed, and
the military balance of power on earth is shattered.”9
Viewed from this context, the fu-st two war forms
represent military revolutions just as significant in
scope as the Tofflers’ emerging Third Wave war
form. Further, they provide the historical foundation
that anchors Third Wave war forecasts.
Fnt Wave war is based on an tinny that engages
in seasonal fighting and is poorly organized,
equipped and led. Pay is irregular (usually in kind),
orders are verbal and combat is based on face-t-
face killing. This war form is primarily a clash
between rulers, with ancient China’s Ch’in state, clas-
sical Greece and feudal Europe being given as pri-
mary Fmt Wave civilization examples. The Roman
legions at their height are mentioned as a notable
exception to this generalization. 10
Second Wave war exists in an environment char-
acterized by mass-produced and standardized
weaponry, the conscription of mass armies and the
shift to unlimited war. Armies become standing and
are led by war academy–trained officers who rely on
written orders. This period, considered the Machine
Age, produced the machinegun, mechanized war-
fare and entirely new tactic forms. This war form
reached its apex with the development of nuclear
weapons of mass destruction. Second Wave war is
conducted by the 19th– and 20th+entury nation–
states where war is no longer a struggle between rul-
ers, but one between peoples engaged in immense
attrition struggles to destroy each other’s main for-
ces and, as this war form developed, societies. 1*
Systematic Problems
Them are historical and methodological problems
with these war forms. The first is a historical one-the
generalization of all Fmt Wave armies as poor war-
fighting institutions. The Tofflers note that the Roman
legions were a notable exception to such agricultural–
based armies. There are many other contradictory
historical exceptions to this characterization.
Not even mentioned is the Mongols’ military sys-
tem. This overlooks Subotai’s brilliant campaigns
into Central and Eastern Europe from 1237 to
1241.12 Byzantine battlefield tactics and strategic
perceptions should also not be forgotten. Maurice’s
Strategikon is the product of an advanced military
system that for centuries toned back the onslaughts
of many foes.13 The well-developed logistic sys-
tems of Charlemagne and Henry the Fowler, the lat-
ter whose lineage created the Holy Roman Empire,
are two other notable exce tions to this improperly
conceived generalization. 1f
The second problem concerns classical and medi-
eval European civilizations existing together within
Tofflerian Waves
Wave When Mode of
Developed Production
First 8000 B.C. Agricultural
Second -1690 A.D. Industrial
Third Current Knowledge
Figure 2.
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the First Wave. Pigeonholing them within an agri-
cultural super-civilization ignores that the classical
and medieval worlds already represent distinct civi-
lization types, each with a specific economy, ideol-
ogy, political and military form. Medieval Europe
was founded on a true military revolution based on
using horses in warfare and the heavy infantryman’s
demise. “The supremacy of cavalry in the Middle
Ages had been as much moral and social as techni-
cal. Developed because of its mobility, endowed
with a total social and economic dominance, it had
for centuries a virtual monopoly of military activity.
Foot soldiers were despised auxiliaries.”15 This rev-
olution transforming classical society into medieval
society is absent from the Tofflerian war forms.
The third problem comes from characterizing
early modern Europe, with its own distinct military
forms based on dynastic struggles, as existing within
the First Wave super-civilization type. This Wriod,
which ultimately caused the ancien rtgirne, is based
on a mercantilist economy, representing a transition
from feudal manorialism to industrial capitalism. 16
The sophisticated 18th-century Prussian military
system-the ultimate expression of this military
tradition-would be categorized by the Tofflers’
typology as a First Wave fighting force on the same
level as a barbarian tribesmen raiding party.17 Thus,
another true military revolution witnessing medi-
eval society’s end and the rise of a new one with its
own distinct war forms-first based on mercenary
and later on professional standing armies-is also
absent from the Toffletian typology.18
The fourth problem concerns the Second Wave
war form’s historical characterization. As currently
conceptualized, the Second Wave represents an
early industrialized form of attrition army. This doc-
trine, generally composed of a massive artillery bar-
rage followed by a frontal assault, was prevalent
from the Napoleonic wars well into World War I.
The 1916 World War I Somme Campaign is a per-
fect example of this war form where defeat was
effected by the machinegun and barbed wire com-
bination. Massive artillery barrages were unable to
reach German machinegun crews who waited them
out in deep underground bunkers and then reestab-
lished their fting positions in time to cut down the
advancing waves of overburdened British infantry-
men. 19 Additionally, no mention is made of Ger-
man operational @ based on the blitzkrieg concept,
giving rise to our modem war form. This concept
recognizes the devastating effect one army can have
on another by driving into its rear areas and paralyz-
ing its decision-making structure.20 Even the
Fourth Generation War theorists make this distinc-
tion with their concepts of Second and Third Gen-
eration war.21
Finally, modem warfare attributes-the Army’s
AirLand operations doctrine-are a logical exten-
sion of German-inspired operational art brought 50
years into the future and not the revolutionary new
Third Wave war form as the Tofflers consider it.22
“What [General Dorm] Starry and major General
Donald R.] Morelli did, without nwessarily making
it explicit, was to place knowledge at the center of
warfare as well. Thus, Third Wave warfare, as we
saw it in the Gulf war], shad many characteristics
of the advanced economy.”23 From this perspective,
the Wehnnacht had already placed knowledge dis-
ruption at their doctrine’s center half a century ago.24
The perception that AirLand Operations is revo-
lutionary arises because the Tofflers’ modem war
concept is outdated. They view massed troops in
trenches and dug–in bunkers simply engaging in
frontal assaults as attributes of modern warfare.25
While much Gulf War technology does represent the
embryonic development of an advanced Western
war form, Army doctrine is still fdy tied to mod-
em warfare principles based on Clausewitzian con-
cepts. America’s Army, while the world’s premier
land force, should still be thought of as a modem
warfighting institution. While it does possess quali-
tatively advanced “strap+n” technologies, these
alone do not make it a fhture force. It will be
decades before our doctrine and tactics adjust to still
emerging technology currently transforming what
we know as modem warfare.
AirLand Operations doctrine may be considered
revolutionary when viewed against older Army
attrition doctrine, but it does not represent an emerg-
ing futuristic war form. The Tofflers would have
done better to look into the radical concepts of the
“scan, swarm, strike and scatter” battle sequence,
deliberate noncontiguity on the battlefield and the
elimination of the tactical logistic rear inherent in
some versions of TRADOC’s Army 21 Interim
Operational Concept. This advanced concept,
existing years before the Force XXI concept, repre-
sents an alternative conceptual view of AirLand
Operations doctrinal follow-on.26
A Precarious Foundation
War form problems arise because Tofflerian
waves are based on economic production modes set
at the super<ivilization level. Therefore, they exist
at too high an abstraction level to account for actual
Western warfare pattern changes and, because of its
close interrelationship, society. The lack of military
history expertise of these scholars further com-
pounds this situation. 27 For these reasons, the Tof-
flers provide a future Third Wave vision that, from a
military perspective, is unsupported by the past. As
discussed, their war form concepts are at odds with
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much of Western military history.
Difficulties also exist with these war forms in
their relationship to specific European production
modes that have been touched upon. Because of
these significant conceptual problems, the fuxt two
Tofflerian war forms, as they are currently carried
out, should be treated with great skepticism. Since
Third Wave war builds upon these two earlier war
forms, future projections are also negatively affected
by these conceptual flaws, but to an unknown extent
since an advanced technological war form-succes-
sor to our modem war conduct—is still emerging.
Tofflerian projections, like those of other scholars,
will not be validated or invalidated for years. Now,
we should critically analyze the methodological and
historical accuracy behind each competing theory
on future Western warfare and assemble a mosaic to
prepare our Armed Forces for the 21st century.
Forwisting, historical trends and assumptior%ased
analysis are inexact sciences at best, but they are all
we have to predict afar different military fiture than
the one currently existing.28
As the leading 20th-century futurists, the Tofflers
were among the fmt to recognize that society, and
later warfare itself, was changing based on techno-
logical advances and our altered relationship to
knowledge. But with an invalidTofflerianwar form
typology and strong suspicioncast over their civili-
zation waves’ applicability to Western history, one
can see that a potential conceptual blind spot exists
within the RMA literature adopted by the Army.
Senior Army leaders should continue examining the
forward-looking aspectsof Toffleriantheory as they
preparetheForceXXIArmyforthemanyunknown
challengesahead. Simultaneously,senior leaders
shouldalso be open to newconceptsof historical
warfaremodes and Westernsocietaldevelopment
andtheircombinedrelationshipto the revolutionin
militaryaffairs.MR
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